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Abstract: Camerer and Lovallo (1999) present a thought-provoking experimental evidence 
that overconfidence might lead to excess entry into markets. As their findings are based on the 
majority of the sessions exclusively consisting of male participants, we replicate their 
experiment while including both men and women in all of our sessions. We are able to only 
partially replicate their main finding that the market entry decisions are driven by 
overconfidence. Surprisingly we also find that self-selection significantly decreases the entry 
rate. However, this is also where we observe gender differences in the entry rate – males who 
self-select into the experiment actually enter more often, which is in line with Camerer & 
Lovallo’s observation. Our experiment thus points out that the overconfidence effect is 
sensitive to the participants’ gender and experimental conditions. 
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1 Introduction 
Do optimistic biases predictably influence economic behavior of firms when entering into 
markets? A large body of psychology and social psychology literature documents that people 
are overconfident about their relative abilities or unreasonably optimistic about their future 
(Alicke, 1985; Dunning et al., 1989; Messick et al., 1985; Svenson, 1981; Taylor and Brown, 
1988). Overconfidence of entrepreneurs and managers could therefore be crucial for 
understanding failures of new businesses. Camerer and Lovallo (1999; henceforth CL) present 
a thought-provoking experimental evidence that overconfidence might lead to excess entry into 
markets. As women are usually less overconfident than men (Lundeberg et al., 1994), CL 
findings are based on the majority of their sessions exclusively consisting of male participants.1 
With the increasing numbers of women managers, entrepreneurs and startup owners over the 
past decades, it is paramount to ascertain whether the excess entry finding is robust to a 
population consisting of both genders. We therefore replicate CL experiment while including 
both men and women in all of our sessions.    
CL offer three possible explanations for business failures: (1) Quick exits that appear to 
be failures are actually hit-and-run entries that are profitable but brief. Profits are made if 
entering the market during the high peak, i.e. when profitability is high, and then leaving (or 
‘failing’) when profitability dies down. Because of the fleeting nature of many business 
opportunities, a failure within a year of startup is probable and expected (Forbes, 2009). (2) 
Business entries are similar to lottery tickets, i.e. most firms expect to lose money and fail, but 
if they become successful, the payoff is large and worth the risk. Entrepreneurs understand the 
nature of risky entries and often report that the key to success is making profits on average 
rather than with every single investment. (3) Many entry decisions are simply mistakes due to 
underestimating the competitors or overconfidence about own abilities. Such mistakes are often 
hard to correct if the performance feedback is imperfect. 
Distinguishing which one of the three explanations influences business failure and to 
what extent can be challenging with happenstance data. To explore the third explanation, CL 
design an economics experiment testing for the effect of overconfidence in one’s skill on market 
entry decisions, i.e. whether overconfidence amplifies the market entry rate. In our study we 
use a mixed-gender subject pool to address the same two main questions as CL: 1. Is there more 
entry when people are betting on their own skill? 2. Are participants neglecting the reference 
group when they volunteer to participate in the experiment, knowing that their payoffs will 
depend on their skill? The answers to these questions deepen our understanding of the origins 
of business failures and can help designing better performance feedback mechanisms.  
Overconfidence occurs when an individual's certainty that his predictions are correct 
exceeds the accuracy of those predictions (Klayman et al., 1999). Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) 
identify three sources of overconfidence: people may overestimate their own abilities, perceive 
themselves more favorably than others perceive them, or perceive themselves more favorably 
than they perceive others. Indeed, a large body of psychology and social psychology literature 
provides evidence that people are overconfident about their relative abilities or unreasonably 
optimistic about their future (Alicke, 1985; Dunning et al., 1989; Messick et al., 1985; Taylor 
and Brown, 1988). The effect has been labelled “better than average”.2 
                                                     
1 CL’s experiment consists of 8 sessions with both genders participating only in sessions 1 and 2. Sessions 3-8 
were composed solely of male participants. CL use data from sessions 1-8 to analyze the link between 
overconfidence and excess entry as well as the impact of self-selection on entry decisions and data from sessions 
3-8 to analyze whether the excess entry was caused by overconfidence or underestimating how many 
participants will enter the market in total. 
2 A popular example of overconfidence is asking a group of average people about their driving ability. Most of 
them will say they are above average even though only about half can be better than average (Svenson, 1981). 
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Related theoretical and empirical literature in economics and finance focuses on 
explaining economic phenomena and particular aspects of behavior associated with 
overconfidence (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Daniel et al., 1998; 
Gervais and Odean, 2001; Weinberg, 2009). Overconfidence in one's skills or relative ability 
can, in financial markets, lead to excessive trading and lower returns (Barber and Odean, 2001), 
distortions in corporate investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), value-reducing 
mergers (Roll, 1986) and to security market anomalies (Daniel et al., 1998).  It has been shown 
to influence the estimation of one’s own ability, performance (Clayson, 2005), level of control 
(Presson and Benassi, 1996), speed with which one can get work done (Buehler et al., 1994), 
accuracy of one’s beliefs (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; Klayman et al., 1999; Soll and Klayman, 
2004; Healy and Moore, 2007) or even expert judgements such as the accuracy of diagnoses 
(Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981). Overconfidence thus appears to be a robust 
phenomenon present in a wide array of professional and business-related decisions, with market 
entry being one of them.  
The experimental literature, to a great degree triggered by CL, identifies numerous 
factors, such as task difficulty (Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005; Moore and Cain, 2007) leading to 
overconfidence. An example of such task where overconfidence plays an important role is the 
introduction of risky products to the market (Simon and Houghton, 2003). Similarly, greater 
overconfidence tends to lead to aggressive behavior in the pursuit of higher wealth (Deaves et 
al., 2009). Interestingly, experience and specialization can, in some scenarios, contribute to 
overconfidence; for example studies by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002); Glaser et al. (2005); 
Glaser et al. (2007) show that experts are more likely to be overconfident than relatively 
inexperienced subjects. However, some other studies find that overconfidence tends to decrease 
with experience (Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2002; Gervais and Odean, 2001; Locke and 
Mann, 2001). The evidence on gender effects in overconfidence is also mixed as the findings 
appear to vary with the task, activity, and/or environment. For example, Beyer (1990) observes 
that the tendency to ascribe success to personal effort and failure to external forces is less 
pronounced in women, while Deaves et al. (2009) find little evidence that gender influences 
trading activity, hinting that more research is necessary to understand the prevalence of 
overconfidence and its driving factors. Testing market entry decisions in a population composed 
of both genders is a step in this direction.  
CL’s design allows one to identify whether market entry is driven by overconfidence. 
Whether an entry is successful or not depends on the market capacity and the entrant’s rank. In 
one scenario, the rank is determined by performance in a task and thus the decision whether to 
enter depends on one’s confidence in his skills relative to others. In the control scenario, the 
rank is determined randomly. CL find that when payoffs from entry depend on skills, excess 
entry is higher than when payoffs are determined randomly, providing evidence of 
overconfident behavior. Furthermore, excess entry is highest when the participants are told in 
advance that their payoffs will depend on their skill, suggesting that participants neglect 
consideration of the reference group with which they will be competing.3 CL use expected 
average profits to distinguish whether the excessive entry was caused by overconfidence or 
underforecasting and find that overconfidence is the main driver.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study testing the robustness of the CL’s finding 
with respect to both genders. Including female participants, who have been shown to be less 
overconfident than males in various other contexts, constitutes a more conservative test of the 
effect of overconfidence on market entry decisions and is a step towards increasing the external 
validity of CL’s results. Our study differs from CL also in two procedural aspects; our 
experiment is fully computerized (as opposed to pen and paper) and instead of solving puzzles 
                                                     
3 Reference group neglect is also known in the literature as egocentrism (Kruger, 1999; Windschitl and 
Chambers, 2004). 
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as in CL, our participants solve mazes. Finally, we use better suited methods to analyze the 
collected data.4 Design parameters, session ordering, and procedures (to the extent known to 
us) remain the same. 
In our experiment, we only partially obtain the same results as CL. While we find a 
mixed evidence that the industry profit is lower in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds 
due to more entry in the skill-rank rounds, we do not find that self-selected participants are 
more overconfident and find no difference in expected average profits between random-rank 
and skill-rank rounds, suggesting that overconfidence might not be as strong of a driving factor 
of entry decisions when both genders are represented amongst the market participants. 
 
2 Experimental design and procedures 
CL employ the market entry game introduced by Selten and Güth (1982) to study the 
link between overconfidence and decisions to enter the market.5 In what follows we present the 
CL modification of the game with rank-based payoffs. Our experiment design follows CL in 
terms of the implemented parameters, session ordering, and procedures to the extent known to 
us. Any differences are discussed below.  
In the repeated market entry game, each participant is endowed with $10 and is informed 
about the market capacity “c”, where 0< c <15 (for the capacity in each round used in the same 
sequence in both CL and our experiment, see Table C1 in Appendix C). The participants then 
simultaneously choose whether to enter the market or not each round. The payoff to the entrants 
depends on the overall number of entrants, pre-announced market capacity c and the entrant’s 
rank. Entrants ranked below c lose their initial endowment, while entrants ranked c or above 
earn a positive sum of money (see Table 1). The top c entrants share $50 proportionally, with 
higher-ranking entrants earning more relative to other entrants.6 Non-entrants do not earn or 
lose any money; they keep their initial endowment. 
The rank is assigned randomly or based on the participant’s skill as determined by 
performance in a real-effort task. In particular, skill-ranks are determined by the speed of 
finishing five mazes (sessions 1 and 2) or by the number of correct answers on a trivia quiz 
about sports and current events (sessions 3-8).7 
 
  
                                                     
4 Namely, we construct a normalized entry rate to compare data across sessions that do not have the same 
capacities in each round; more on this in Results section.  
5 For a theoretical analysis of the standard version of the market entry game and a recent review of the empirical 
literature see Collins et al. (2017). 
6 If the number of entrants is lower than c, the entrants share $50 proportionally, i.e. the entrant with the lowest 
rank receives the smallest $ amount, the entrant with the second lowest rank receives twice as much as the 
previous one etc.  
7 CL’s design involved solving ten puzzles, details of which were not reported in the paper. Instead of puzzles, 
our participants solve mazes, which is a somewhat comparable task in terms of skills. We calibrated the number 
of mazes to five based on the expected time (10 minutes) it would take the participants to solve them. Our 
objective was to implement a task that would require display of skills but that would not unnecessarily prolong 
the experimental session. 
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Table 1. Rank-based payoffs* 
Rank 
Market Capacity 
c=2 c=4 c=6 c=8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
* Payoff in $ for successful entrants as a function of “c” 
 
The game is played in two blocks, each consisting of 12 rounds (24 rounds in total). In 
one of the two blocks the rank is determined randomly (R), in the other block the rank depends 
on skills (S). This feature is implemented in a within-subject design, i.e. the same participants 
participate in both blocks of rounds. Participants are told in advance in which block of rounds 
the rank is assigned randomly and in which it depends on their skill. To control for order effects, 
in half of the sessions the block of rounds with random rank is run first, followed by the block 
of rounds with skill-dependent rank. In the other half of the sessions the order is reversed, i.e. 
the block of rounds with skill-dependent rank is run first and the random rank second. With the 
exception of sessions 1 and 2 as the in the original CL experiment, the random-rank rounds 
have the exact same order of c’s as the skill-rank rounds and thus the two blocks are directly 
comparable. 
Along with their individual entry decisions, participants forecast how many entrants 
they expect in that round. For each correct forecast, the participants earn $1. CL use these 
forecasts to distinguish between participants who enter because they underestimate the number 
of competitors and participants who are overconfident about their skills and who therefore enter 
because they think their performance on the quiz or maze is better than average. Participants’ 
ranks are not revealed until the end of the experiment, i.e. after their market entry decisions for 
all 24 rounds. 
A total of 118 participants, 59 males and 59 females, took part in the experiment. The 
experimental sessions were conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics 
Laboratory (NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. Participants were recruited using the 
online database system ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Each participant only participated in a single 
session of the study, and had not participated in any similar market entry experiment run at 
NZEEL. 
The invitation, similarly as in CL, differed in information provided to the participants 
before signing up for the experiment. In sessions 1-4 the participants were invited to participate 
in the experiment with an opportunity to make money. In addition to that, in sessions 5-8, the 
participants were told in the invitation email that their payoff in the experiment would depend 
on their skills, especially their knowledge about current events and sports.8 In these latter 
sessions it was possible for participants confident of their abilities to self-select into the 
experiment (see Table 2 for the session overview). 
                                                     
8 CL do not report the details how their participants were invited to the experiment or what the communication 
channel was. The information included in the invitation email to participants in our database was as follows: 
“Earn money in an experiment in which performance on sports and current events trivia will determine your 
payoff. If you are very good you might earn a considerable sum of money.” The latter part of the sentence is 
reproduced from the CL paper. 
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Unlike CL experiment, our experiment was fully computerized (i.e. including the 
mazes) using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The number of participants in a session varied from 
12 to 16. All sessions were run under a single-blind social distance protocol in which there was 
a complete anonymity between participants but not with respect to the experimenter. On 
average, a session lasted 50 minutes including the payment. The participants earned 13.80 NZD 
on average.9  
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were asked to sit in a cubicle of their choice. 
At the beginning of the experiment instructions (provided in Appendix A) were handed out, as 
well as projected onto a screen and read aloud by the experimenter. Participants then had a few 
minutes to go through the instructions again, this time in their own pace. Any questions arising 
were answered in private. All participants had to answer the control questions (provided in 
Appendix B) correctly before they could proceed to the decision-making part of the experiment. 
This procedure allowed us to assess the understanding of instructions and clarify any confusion. 
After the control questions, participants first entered their decisions in each of 24 rounds and 
only then engaged in a task that determined their rank for the skill based rounds. Upon the 
completion of the experiment, they were also asked to fill out a questionnaire. Participants were 
then called one by one to receive their payment in private in the control room at the back of the 
laboratory.  
 
Table 2. Experimental sessions 
Session # n Invitation Block Order Skill 
1 12 No self-selection R/S Maze 
2 14 No self-selection S/R Maze 
3 16 No self-selection R/S Quiz 
4 16 No self-selection S/R Quiz 
5 16 Self-selection R/S Quiz 
6 16 Self-selection S/R Quiz 
7 14 Self-selection R/S Quiz 
8 14 Self-selection S/R Quiz 
R= random-rank, S=skill-rank 
 
3 Hypotheses 
 
Using data from our experiment we test the original CL’s hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is lower industry profit (and thus more entry) in skill-rank rounds than in 
random-rank rounds. 
 
If participants are overconfident, they will enter the market more often in skill-rank 
rounds, which will result in lower industry profits, i.e. if the number of entrants is higher than 
c, the industry profit will be negative. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The profit differential between skill-rank and random-rank rounds in four 
sessions with self-selection is larger than in the remaining four sessions with no self-selection.  
 
                                                     
9 For reference, at the time of the experiment 1 NZD = 0.7883 USD and the adult minimum wage in New Zealand 
was 14.25 NZD per hour. 
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The larger the skill-rank and random-rank profit differential, the more entry will be 
observed in the skill-rank rounds. If the entrants neglect the reference group, i.e. enter more 
because of overconfidence in their skill but ignore that all other entrants are doing the same, 
the differential between the skill-rank and random-rank will be larger in sessions with self-
selection than in session with no self-selection.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The expected average profit is smaller in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank 
rounds. 
 
The expected average profit is calculated based on the forecasts of participants. If 
participants decide to enter because they think fewer people will enter, then the expected 
average profit will be higher in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. If, however, 
participants enter more often because they are overconfident about their relative skills, the 
expected average profit will be lower in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. 
 
4 Results 
 
The section is organized as follows: We (attempt to) replicate CL’s results by applying 
the tests they use to our data. These results are always reported first. It is important to note that 
in CL’s design (which we replicate) sessions 1 and 2 have a different order of c’s across rounds. 
That is, participants in session 1 face a different order of c’s than participants in session 2, 
making these two sessions not directly comparable. To rectify the issue, in addition to CL’s 
analysis, we (i) analyze data only from sessions 3-8 and (ii) we calculate the normalized entry 
rate that addresses the different order of c’s in sessions 1 and 2 and thus allows us to perform 
tests on data from all sessions (i.e. 1-8). 
The industry profit, calculated by adding profits of successful entrants and losses of 
unsuccessful entrants in a given round, is strictly positive in 81 (=84%) and negative in 5 out 
of 96 random-rank rounds (12 rounds/session x 8 sessions = 96 observed rounds in each block). 
The industry profit is zero in the remaining 10 random-rank rounds. The average industry profit 
across random-rank rounds is $29.28. In the skill-rank rounds the industry profit is strictly 
positive in 76 (=79%) and negative in 9 out of 96 rounds. The average profit across skill-rank 
rounds is $26.14. 
 
 
4.1. Industry profit and market entry 
 
Hypothesis 1 states there will be a lower industry profit (resulting from more entry) in 
the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. The hypothesis is based on a conjecture 
that when participants are betting on their own skill they will enter more often, which will in 
turn lower the total industry profit.  
Following CL, we first test for differences in the industry profit between the skill-rank 
and random-rank rounds using a matched pairs t-test.10 Recall that each experimental session 
consists of two blocks composed of twelve random-rank and twelve skill-rank rounds. The test 
is conducted as follows. The industry profit from the first twelve random-rank rounds in session 
1 is matched with industry profit from the first twelve skill-rank rounds in session 2. Similarly, 
the industry profit from the skill-rank rounds in session 3 is matched with the industry profit 
                                                     
10 We report the t-test in order to make our results easily comparable with CL. 
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from the random-rank rounds in session 4. In the same way session 5 with 6, and 7 with 8 are 
matched. In sessions 3-8, each pair of rounds being compared has the same value of c’s, the 
same history (or path) of previous values of c’s, and differs only in how the rank was 
determined. We followed this procedure in order to replicate the original design by CL and so 
preserved the order of c’s in sessions 1 and 2. The matched pairs t-test does not detect a 
difference between profits in the random-rank rounds and the skill-rank rounds (p-
value=0.193). Our result differs from the one obtained by CL who find that the industry profit 
is significantly lower in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds when using 
individual data from sessions 1-8 (CL’s p-value < 0.001). 
The fact that participants in session 1 face a different order of c’s than participants in 
session 2, makes these sessions not directly comparable. We thus exclude these two sessions 
from the matched pairs t-test. The t-test for sessions 3-8 supports CL’s finding that there is more 
entry in the skill-rank rounds (i.e. more overconfidence in one’s skill) as the industry profits 
are lower in the skill-rank than in the random-rank rounds (p-value=0.084) albeit this effect is 
not as strong as in CL.  
In order to be able to use the data from sessions 1 and 2 (which do not have the same 
order of c’s) we calculate a normalized entry rate. The normalized entry rate is the ratio of the 
number of entrants and the actual capacity c in the respective round, where 100% means that 
the number of entrants was exactly the same as c in the given round. If the normalized entry 
rate is higher than 100%, there are more entrants than c. If it is less than 100%, the market is 
not saturated and it is possible for more participants to enter the market and make profit. By 
calculating the normalized entry rate we are able to control for different c’s in the given round 
between sessions 1 and 2. Using the normalized entry rate we then test whether there is more 
entry (a higher normalized entry rate) in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. 
The t-test does not detect a statistically significant difference in normalized entry rates between 
the skill-rank and random-rank rounds (p-value=0.482). 
In addition to tests reported by CL, one can also test for within-subject comparisons as 
each participant took part both in the random-rank and skill-rank rounds. To test whether there 
is a difference in industry profit as well as in normalized entry rates between random-rank 
rounds and skill-rank rounds within a session we use the Wilcoxon rank sum test; p-values for 
each session are reported in Table 3 below. Except for the industry profit in session 6, where 
the profit in the random-rank rounds is weakly statistically higher than in the skill-rank rounds, 
none of the other tests show that industry profits are different in the random-rank rounds than 
in the skill-rank rounds of the same session. 
In summary, using participants of both genders we find mixed evidence of excess entry 
due to overconfidence when comparing behavior in the skill-rank compared to the random-rank 
rounds. 
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Table 3. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for the difference in industry 
profits and normalized entry rate between the random-rank and the skill-rank rounds 
within subjects 
Session 
# 
Random-
rank 
Skill-
rank 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum 
test 
(p-value) 
Random-
rank 
[%] 
Skill-
rank 
[%] 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum 
test 
(p-value) 
1 
370 450 0.310 140.0 131.8 0.843 
2 
330 260 0.478 176.4 189.7 0.3762 
3 
180 120 0.174 241.7 240.3 0.237 
4 
330 310 0.657 191.0 195.1 0.693 
5 
400 370 0.250 158.3 173.0 0.172 
6 
330 160 0.012 184.0 231.3 0.009 
7 
340 330 0.809 165.7 171.9 0.691 
8 
530 510 0.657 94.9 108.8 0.265 
 
 
 
4.2. Reference group neglect 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the profit differential between the skill-rank and random-rank 
rounds in sessions with self-selection is larger than in sessions without self-selection due to the 
reference group neglect.  
Following CL, we first conduct a matched pairs t-test comparing the skill-random profit 
differential between sessions 1-4 (without self-selection) and 5-8 (with self-selection), the result 
of which does not support Hypothesis 2 (p-value=0.432). This finding stands in contrast with 
the one obtained by CL who observe that the reference group neglect produces a significantly 
larger skill-random rank entry differential in sessions with self-selected participants than in 
sessions without self-selection (p-value < 0.001); see Table 4 for a comparison of our results 
with CL.  
In addition to the test performed using data from sessions 1-8 as in CL, we run a matched 
pairs t-test comparing the skill-random profit differential between sessions 3-4 and 5-8 (i.e. 
excluding sessions 1 and 2 that have different order of c’s). This test also does not support the 
hypothesis that differential is larger in sessions with self-selection than without (p-
value=0.659).   
In summary, applying the t-test (used by CL) to our data, we find that the profit 
differential between skill-rank and random-rank rounds is not larger in sessions with self-
selection than without self-selection, pointing out that overconfidence does not increase with 
self-selection in a population composed of both genders 
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Table 4. Comparison of CL’s results vs. ours 
 
CL 
(sessions 1-8) 
Our study 
(sessions 1-8) 
Our study 
(sessions 3-8 
only) 
Avg. profit random-
rank 
$16.87 29.27 $29.31 
Avg. profit skill-rank $-1.56 $26.15 $25.00 
Matched pairs t-test 
t=-7.43 
p<0.001 
t=1.311 
p=0.193 
t=1.755 
p=0.084 
Avg. profit without 
self-selection, 
random-rank 
$19.79 $25.21 $21.25 
Avg. profit without 
self-selection, skill-
rank 
$10.83 $23.75 $17.92 
Avg. profit self-
selection, random-
rank 
$13.96 $33.33 $33.33 
Avg. profit self-
selection, skill-rank 
$-13.13 $28.54 $28.54 
Matched pairs t-test 
t=-4.08 
p<0.001 
t=0.793                           
p=0.432 
t=-0.447 
p=0.659 
 
 
4.3 Expected profit differential in skill and random rounds 
 
The results in the previous subsections provide mixed evidence for overconfidence 
resulting in excess entry, and demonstrate that unlike in CL, in our experiment self-selection 
does not increase the strength of the overconfidence effect. These tests, however, do not control 
for all possible explanations. Excessive entry in the skill-rank rounds may not necessarily be 
due to overconfidence about one’s skills, but due to the underestimating how many participants 
will enter in total (CL call this the “blind spot” hypothesis). If the number of expected entrants 
is underestimated, it decreases the participants’ payoffs because they enter even though they 
should not. In order to test whether the expectations are correct, we ask participants to saliently 
forecast the number of entrants in each round.11  
On average, the number of forecasted entrants in all sessions is 6.07 and 6.23 entrants 
in random-rank and skill-rank rounds, respectively. The actual number of entrants in all sessions 
is on average 5.75 and 6.26 for the random-rank rounds and the skill-rank rounds, respectively 
(see Figure 1 in Appendix C). The difference between forecasted and actual entrants in the 
random-rank rounds is not statistically significantly different (Mann-Whitney p-
value=0.599)12. In the skill-rank rounds this difference is not statistically significant either 
(Mann-Whitney p-value=0.916). In the random-rank rounds participants forecast about 0.32 
entrants too high and in the skill-rank rounds their forecast is converging to the actual number 
of entrants. 
                                                     
11 The specific question we asked before each round is: “How many people (including yourself) do you expect to 
enter the market in this round?” If a participant forecasted the number of entrants correctly, $1 was added to his/her 
payoff in the respective round. 
12 CL only report a regression in which they use data from sessions 3-8. 
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To separate overconfidence from incorrect estimates of others’ entry CL use the 
obtained forecasts to compute the profit that a participant expects the average entrant to earn, 
calculated in a following way:  
 
Ej(πijt) = (50-10*(Fijt - cit))/ Fijt,      (1) 
 
where Ej(πijt) is the expected average profit, Fijt is the forecast of participant j used to calculate 
the profit that participant j expects the average entrant to earn, and cit is the capacity in the 
particular round. 
Separating overconfidence from incorrect estimates of others’ entry requires testing the 
hypothesis that the expected average profit is larger in the random-rank rounds than in the skill-
rank rounds. If participants decide to enter in the skill-rank rounds because they think that fewer 
other participants will enter, the expected average profit in the skill-rank rounds will be larger. 
Including Ej(πijt) in the entry regression, reported in the next subsection, will separate out the 
effect falsely attributed to skill. If, on the other hand, the participants enter because they are 
more overconfident in the skill-rank rounds compared to the random-rank rounds, not taking 
into account the number of entrants they expect to enter, the expected average profits will be 
smaller in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. The overconfident participants 
will expect to earn more than the average entrant and enter even when the expected average 
profit is low.  
Following CL, we therefore calculate the differential between expected average profits 
in the random-rank rounds (denoted πr) and in the skill-rank rounds (denoted πs), using only the 
rounds in which participants entered. A negative differential, i.e. larger profits in the skill-rank 
rounds than in the random-rank rounds, represents the incorrect estimation of entrants, whereas 
a positive differential represents overconfidence. In Table 4 we report the mean differential πr 
- πs, averaged across entering participants, the number and percentage of participants who have 
a negative mean (i.e. who expect less average profit in the skill-rank rounds), and the number 
and percentage of participants whose expected average profit is negative, on average, across 
the random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds. For completeness, in rows 3 and 4 we also report 
a percentage of entrants whose profit is lower than 0 in the random-rank rounds and the skill-
rank rounds. 
The mean differential πr - πs is negative in sessions 1 and 2, suggesting an incorrect 
estimation of number of entrants by participants, and positive in sessions 3 and 4, suggesting 
the presence of overconfidence. In session 1, 44% of the participants expect to earn less in the 
skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. In sessions 2, 3 and 4, it is respectively 
57%, 46% and 67% of participants. In the self-selection sessions 5-8, the mean differential πr - 
πs is negative in all sessions, except for session 8, where the differential is positive and 
suggests the presence of overconfidence. In session 5 only 18% of the participants expect to 
earn less in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. In session 6, 7 and 8 it is 
57%, 38% and 75%, respectively. The t-test does not detect a significant difference in the 
average differential of expected profits per person between the self-selection sessions and the 
no self-selection sessions (p-value=0.913). In other words, there is no difference in the 
expected average profit between the skill-rank rounds and the random-rank rounds. 
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Table 4. The average differential in expected profits per entrant between the random-
rank and skill-rank rounds 
Measure Session 
1 
Session 
2 
Session 
3 
Session 
4 
Session 
5 
Session 
6 
Session 
7 
Session 
8 
Total 
Πr - Πs -1.126 -0.665 0.023 1.832 -1.094 -0.886 -1.718 4.483 1.036 
# of 
entrants 
with Πr - 
Πs<0 
(percent) 
5/9 
(56%) 
6/14 
(43%) 
7/13 
(54%) 
4/12 
(33%) 
9/11 
(82%) 
6/14 
(43%) 
8/13 
(62%) 
2/8 
(25%) 
47/94 
(50%) 
# of 
entrants 
with Πr 
<0 
(percent) 
0/9 
(0%) 
0/13 
(0%) 
3/12 
(25%) 
1/11 
(9%) 
0/10 
(0%) 
0/11 
(0%) 
0/12 
(0%) 
0/8 
(0%) 
4/86 
(5%) 
# of 
entrants 
with Πs 
<0 
(percent) 
0/8 
(0%) 
1/14 
(7%) 
0/11 
(0%) 
2/12 
(17%) 
0/11 
(0%) 
2/14 
(14%) 
0/13 
(0%) 
0/8 
(0%) 
5/91 
(5%) 
  
 
4.1 Logistic regression  
Table 5 reports a fixed-effects logistic regression of the entry decision. In line with the 
t-test results using the industry profits as well as the normalized entry rates, we find that the 
entry rate in the skill-rank rounds is not higher than in the random-rank rounds. While one 
might think that excess entry by males, as observed in CL, is offset by females entering 
significantly less often, this is not what we find in our data; as per the regression results, being 
male does not affect the entry rate. 
Unlike the results of the t-test, our regression results show that participants who received 
an invitation email saying that their payoffs in the experiment (variable Self-selection in the 
regression) will depend on their skills enter less than those who received a generic invitation 
email without such information (which is in stark contrast to CL). Curiously, this is where we 
do observe gender differences -- the coefficient associated with the interaction term of being 
male and self-selection is positive and highly statistically significant, meaning that males in 
self-selection sessions enter more often (48%) than females (27%). The difference in entry rates 
of males and females is highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001; chi-square test). 
Similarly to CL, we also find the effect of the expected profit to be negative and 
significant. CL hypothesize that this is due to subjects planning to enter and forecasting a lot of 
entry, so the expected average profit is lower when they enter and relate the explanation to the  
false consensus effect in which people use their own decision as a clue about what others will 
do. Finally, economics students enter less often than non-economics and participants in sessions 
with the mazes enter more often than participants in sessions with the quiz. 
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Table 5. Fixed effects logistic regression of the entry decision 
 Selected demographics All Demographics 
Variable Coefficient 
(Robust 
Std. Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. 
Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept -0.113   
(0.241)     
 -0.47   
(0.639)     
-0.413    
(0.440) 
 -0.94    
(0.349) 
C -0.030   
(0.024) 
-0.007 -1.24   
(0.213) 
-0.026  
(0.025)  
-0.005 -1.04 
(0.299) 
E(πijt) -0.015***   
(0.004)     
-0.004 -3.50   
(0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005)       
-0.003 -3.58 
(0.001) 
Skill 0.078   
(0.110) 
0.033 0.70   
(0.482) 
0.086 
(0.112)        
0.033 0.76    
(0.445) 
ECON -0.489***    
(0.086) 
-0.111 -5.66   
(0.001) 
-0.429*** 
(0.096)     
-0.091 -4.44   
(0.001) 
Self-selection -0.825***    
(0.155) 
-0.053 -5.31   
(0.001) 
-0.991*** 
(0.170)     
-0.084 -5.85    
(0.001) 
Male 0.001   
(0.112) 
0.113 0.00   
(0.998) 
0.011 
(0.125)      
0.108 0.09    
(0.932) 
Maze 0.244**   
(0.116) 
0.056 2.11   
(0.035) 
0.148 
(0.120)      
0.032 1.24    
(0.216) 
Age    -0.067*** 
(0.010)     
-0.014 -6.52    
(0.001) 
Non New 
Zealander 
   -0.090 
(0.118)     
-0.019 -0.76    
(0.447) 
Siblings    0.137***  
(0.033)         
0.029 4.20   
 (0.001) 
Relative 
Income 
   -0.138** 
(0.057)     
-0.029 -2.42    
(0.015) 
City size    0.530*** 
(0.051) 
0.112 10.36   
 (0.001) 
Living with 
others 
   0.106*** 
(0.026) 
0.023 4.04    
(0.001) 
Money    0.001 
(0.001) 
6.50e-06 0.33    
(0.743) 
Finance study    0.0002 
(0.0013) 
0.001 0.16    
(0.873) 
Rely    -0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.005 -1.21    
(0.225) 
Order 
Random/Skill 
0.142*  
(0.080) 
0.032 1.79   
(0.074) 
0.289***  
(0.086)    
0.061 3.34    
(0.001) 
Self-
selection*Skill 
0.134   
(0.158) 
 0.85   
(0.395) 
0.140 
0.162    
 0.86    
(0.390) 
Self-
selection*Male 
0.998***   
(0.162) 
 6.16   
(0.001) 
1.004*** 
(0.184)      
 5.46    
(0.001) 
Round dummy yes   yes   
Log-likelihood -1830.875 Pseudo R2=0.0434 -1737.1825 Pseudo R2=0.0923 
 
Sessions 1-8 (CL report sessions 3-8; we provide such regression in Table C2 in appendix C), n=2832, standard 
errors are not clustered at the session level because of a small number of sessions. 
Run on StataSE 13.0. Robust standard errors used. Round 24 is the omitted control variable.  
*, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Description of demographic variables:  non New Zealander represents participants who are not from New Zealand; 
siblings represents number of siblings; relative income represents income far below avg., below avg., average, 
above avg. or far above avg. (from 1 to 5). City size, living with others, money, finance study and rely represent 
the size of the city from 2000 to 100 000+; number of people in a household, share of monthly expenses one 
finances alone; reliability of the data provided - 9 being most reliable. 
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5 Discussion 
CL propose a novel idea that business failures might be caused by overconfidence of 
those who decide to enter the market. In testing their conjecture, they find that males 
overconfident about their skills are more likely to enter the market and that overconfidence 
increases with self-selection. In the current experiment, we seek to replicate CL using a sample 
composed of both genders, making it a more conservative, and given the increased number of 
female managers and entrepreneurs observed in recent years also more timely test of their 
conjecture. Apart from including both genders in all our sessions and running the experiment 
with the use of computers, we tried to keep the design and procedures as close as possible to 
CL. We analyze our data the same way as CL do and augment their approach by adding more 
suitable tests that allow us to properly utilize the entire data sample. 
Our results differ somewhat from CL as we were able to only partially replicate their 
finding that the industry profit is lower and thus that there is more entry in the skill-rank 
compared to the random-rank rounds. When we compare the profit differential between the 
skill-rank and random-rank rounds using the t-test (as in CL), its results indicate that 
overconfidence does not increase with self-selection in a population composed of both genders. 
Regression results, on the other hand, show that self-selection significantly decreases the entry 
rate, which is in stark contrast to CL. However, this is also where we observe gender differences 
in the entry rate – males who self-select into the experiment enter more often, which is in line 
with CL’s observation. We also find that when participants are expecting higher profits, they 
enter less often, which is the same result as in CL. Finally, we observe no difference between 
entry caused by incorrect estimates of others’ entry or overconfidence in the sessions with or 
without self-selection.  
Apart from the above-described differences between our experiment and CL, there 
might be additional reasons for the diverging results. First and foremost, our experiment was 
conducted in New Zealand as opposed to the U.S., some 20 years later than the original CL 
study. New Zealand students have a tendency to be rather shy whereas US students known to 
be quite outspoken, which could have contributed to their decisions (and confidence) in the 
experiment. Second, CL procedures are described to the experimental economics standard and 
as such they do not include details regarding, for example, how the participants were recruited 
for the sessions or what the quiz questions or puzzles were, since from the perspective of the 
research question these individual features are unlikely to play a role. However, as seen in other 
areas of experimental research, for example dictator games, the results are often sensitive to a 
variety of seemingly innocuous variations (Cooper and Kagel, 2009). It is therefore possible 
that our procedures deviated from the original ones to some extent and these minor procedural 
differences have in turn affected the observed behavior. The lesson in all this is that the 
overconfidence effect is sensitive to the participants’ gender and experimental conditions. 
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Appendix A Instructions  
Session 1 and 2 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time during the 
experiment. 
 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, please 
alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of decisions 
consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the rank is 
determined.  
In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your speed of finishing the mazes (as 
will be explained later). In the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly.  
(Session 2 instructions read: In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly. In 
the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your speed of finishing the mazes (as 
will be explained later)). 
 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the beginning of 
each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You can think of “c” as 
the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of entrants in the previous 
round.  
 
Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings for 
that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in each round will depend on your rank relative 
to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
 
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or unsuccessful 
entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a successful entrant. If 
your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful entrant. The unsuccessful 
entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of that round. The payoffs of 
successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table below.  
 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round will 
determine your payoff. 
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Rank 
Capacity 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
 
All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round you 
will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect to enter 
the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same as the actual 
number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff in that round.  
 
The Maze 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be given five mazes to 
solve. You need to find the shortest way from one end of the maze to another. If you have 
highlighted all the correct squares in the maze, the OK button will pop up. Click OK in order 
to continue. The participant, who finishes the mazes the fastest, will be ranked number 1. A 
participant, who is the second fastest, will be ranked number 2 and so on.  
 
Correct way:    Incorrect way:         Incorrect way: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0.  
 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round will 
determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision is 
private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during or 
after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
 
Are there any questions?  
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Sessions 3-8  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time during the 
experiment. 
 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, please 
alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of decisions 
consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the rank is 
determined.  
In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly. In the second 12 rounds your 
rank will be determined by your score on a quiz (as will be explained later). 
(Sessions 4, 6 and 8 read: In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your score 
on a quiz (as will be explained later). In the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined 
randomly.) 
 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the beginning of 
each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You can think of “c” as 
the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of entrants in the previous 
round.  
 
Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings for 
that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in that round will depend on your rank relative 
to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
 
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or unsuccessful 
entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a successful entrant. If 
your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful entrant. The unsuccessful 
entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of that round. The payoffs of 
successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table below.  
 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round will 
determine your payoff. 
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Rank 
Capacity  “c” 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
 
All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round you 
will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect to enter 
the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same as the actual 
number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff in that round.  
 
The Quiz 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be asked to participate in 
a multiple choice quiz. There are 30 sports & current events questions in the quiz, each 
question has only one correct answer. You will have 10 minutes to answer all questions. A 
participant with the most correct answers will be ranked number 1, etc. If two or more 
participants correctly answered the same number of questions, the ties will be broken by the 
shorter amount of time taken to answer all questions. 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0. 
 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round will 
determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision is 
private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during or 
after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
Are there any questions?  
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Appendix B Control Questions 
 
1. How much would you earn in a round if c=6, you entered and your rank was 5 among 
the entrants?  
 
2. How much would you earn in a round if c=2, you entered and your rank was 4 among 
the entrants?  
 
3. How much would you earn in a round if you decided not to enter the market? 
 
4. How many rounds are there in total in this experiment? 
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Appendix C Auxiliary Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table C1. Market capacity "c" values 
Round Session 1 Session 2 Session 3-6 Session 7 and 8 
1 2 8 2 4 
2 4 4 6 2 
3 8 2 4 6 
4 6 6 4 8 
5 4 4 2 6 
6 2 2 6 4 
7 8 8 4 2 
8 6 6 6 8 
9 4 4 2 6 
10 6 2 6 4 
11 8 8 4 2 
12 2 6 2 8 
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Table C2. Fixed effects logistic regression of the entry decision, sessions 3-8 
 Selected demographics All Demographics 
Variable Coefficient 
(Robust 
Std Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std 
Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept -0.318   
(0.288) 
 -1.11   
(0.268) 
0.079   
(0.546) 
 0.14    
(0.885) 
C -0.055*   
(0.032) 
-0.012 -1.70   
(0.089) 
-0.036    
(0.033) 
-0.008 -1.07    
(0.286) 
E(πijt) -0.002   
(0.004) 
-0.0001 -0.57   
(0.570) 
-0.005    
(0.004) 
-0.001 -1.07    
(0.286) 
Skill 0.127    
(0.149) 
0.042 0.85   
(0.395) 
0.132   
0.149 
0.041 0.88    
(0.377) 
ECON -0.373***   
(0.100) 
-0.084 -3.78   
(0.001) 
-0.520***   
(0.114) 
-0.110 -4.58    
(0.001) 
Self-selection -0.919***   
(0.172) 
-0.050 -5.35   
(0.001) 
-1.172***     
(0.195) 
-0.085 -6.01    
(0.001) 
Male -0.204   
(0.152) 
0.126 -1.34   
(0.179) 
-0.231    
(0.166) 
0.130 -1.39    
(0.163) 
Age    -0.081***    
(0.013) 
-0.017 -6.36    
(0.001) 
Non New 
Zealander 
   -0.050    
(0.127) 
-0.010 -0.39    
(0.696) 
Siblings    0.021    
(0.038) 
0.004 0.54   
 (0.586) 
Relative 
Income 
   -0.088    
(0.070) 
-0.019 -1.26   
(0.208) 
City size    0.562***   
(0.060) 
0.118 9.28    
(0.001) 
Living with 
others 
   0.030    
(0.032) 
0.006 0.94    
(0.348) 
Money    0.000 
  (0.0001) 
0.0001 0.67    
(0.502) 
Finance study    0.0009    
(0.002) 
0.0002 0.61    
(0.542) 
Rely    -0.034*  
 (0.019) 
-0.007 -1.80    
(0.071) 
Order 
Random/Skill 
0.339***   
(0.093) 
0.076 3.66   
(0.001) 
0.445*** 
 (0.100) 
0.094 4.46    
(0.001) 
Self-
selection*Skill 
0.091   
(0.186) 
 0.49   
(0.625) 
0.102 
(0.189) 
 0.54    
(0.592) 
Self-
selection*Male 
1.187***    
(0.192) 
 6.19   
(0.001) 
1.324***   
(0.224) 
 5.91    
(0.001) 
Round dummy yes   yes   
Log-likelihood -1418.1675 Pseudo R2= 0.0432 -1344.4625 Pseudo R2= 0.0929 
Sessions 3-8, n=2208, standard errors are not clustered at the session level because of a small number of 
sessions. 
Run on StataSE 13.0. Robust standard errors used. Round 24 is the omitted control variable.  
*, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Description of demographic variables:  non New Zealander represents participants who are not from New 
Zealand; siblings represents number of siblings; relative income represents income far below avg, below avg, 
average, above avg or far above avg (from 1 to 5). City size, living with others, money, finance study and rely 
represent the size of the city from 2000 to 100 000+; number of people in a household, share of monthly 
expenses one finances alone; reliability of the data provided - 9 being most reliable. 
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Figure C1. Average forecasted and actual number of entrants in random-rank rounds 
and skill-rank rounds  
  
 
 
Figure C2. Matched-pair skill-random differential in number of entrants 
 
 
 
Figure C3. Averaged skill-random entry differential 
 
 
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
en
tr
an
ts
Random-rank rounds
Forecast Random-rank
Actual Entry Random-rank
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
en
tr
an
ts
Skill-rank rounds
Forecast Skill-rank
Actual Entry Skill-rank
